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LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
W. Lee Hargrave*
THE 1974 CONSTITUTION
Hainkel v. Henry,' the first major Louisiana Supreme
Court decision construing the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
is not as significant for its holding as for the methodology and
the sources it uses in construing the new constitution. The
method of analysis and use of sources are no minor matters;
with a new, shorter constitution, shorn of detail, the approaches to construing the 1921 constitution and its amendments may not work well.
Though Louisiana courts have accepted and applied the
principle that a state legislature possesses plenary power to
do anything not prohibited by the constitution even absent a
grant of power, the fact that the 1921 constitution contained
so many grants of power, often grants coupled with explicit or
implicit limitations, resulted in the general principle being
applied less often than it might otherwise have been. The
1974 constitution, deliberately short, intentionally concise,
and knowingly avoiding grants of power, will require application of the principle more often. The convention used the
principle as its basic starting point, 2 and a narrow construction of legislative power under the document would thwart its
purpose of giving more flexibility to the legislature. Hainkel
applies the principle straightforwardly:
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 313 So. 2d 577 (La. 1975). Hainkel involved a question of whether
legislative committees, as permitted by the rules of the legislature, could
meet and take action on a bill on a day when neither house of the legislature
was in session. As nothing in the constitution prohibits such meetings, the
court properly concluded that such a meeting was permitted.
2. General Guideline No. 1 of the Manual on Style and Drafting provided:
"The general rule of state constitutional interpretation is: The provisions of a
state constitution are limitations on the power of the people exercised
through the legislature; what is not prohibited by the constitution is permitted. Therefore, the legislature is empowered to enact any law not prohibited
by the constitution; it is unnecessary to specify, for example: The legislature
has the power to enact laws providing for punishment for crime. In the
absence of constitutional prohibition, the legislature has that power." 1 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

OF 1973, 769 (1973).
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Thus, in the absence of a particular constitutional provision that limits the power of the legislature to act in the
respects assailed, a legislative action cannot be invali3
dated as contrary to the state's constitution.
Significant, too, is the court's use of the documents of the
convention to assist it in applying the constitutional provisions. The inquiry into "legislative intent" in Louisiana is
often a fiction involving determination of what the legislature
must have meant in enacting a statute, a result necessitated
by a lack of information on the legislature's purposes, since
committee hearings and legislative debates are not transcribed and published. However, the documents of the convention have been preserved and are available as the best
source of purpose and intent of the convention. The court
refers to those documents several times in its opinion in
Hainkel. The availability of the documents, 4 plus the court's
imprimatur on their use, will be of tremendous assistance in
giving insight into the background of the constitution and
will have the salutary effect of providing in many instances
an intent that is more real than fiction.
More broadly, one might wonder why the questions of
legislative procedure involved in Hainkel reached the court at
all, especially via a "friendly" declaratory judgment action
instituted by two members of the legislature against the
leaders of both houses. 5 One could easily envision that such a
3. 313 So. 2d at 579.
4. The Official Journal of the convention, in two volumes, contains the
text of all proposals and proposed amendments, as well as a record of actions
taken by the convention on those proposals. It provides information as to
changes made in language and as to amendments that were rejected by the
convention. The proceedings of the convention, in typewritten volumes, are a
verbatim transcript of all proceedings that occurred on the convention floor.
In addition, all committee proposals and official committee reports accompanying and explaining those proposals have been preserved. Some of the
committees recorded their committee meetings, and some of those tapes have
been transcribed.
These documents are in the custody of the Constitutional Convention
Records Commission, housed in the L.S.U. Law Center and mandated by
statute to make them available to the public. La. Acts 1974, No. 457. Until
publication, the Commission is making copies of parts of the proceedings on
request. Copies of the convention transcripts are available in New Orleans at
the Supreme Court Library, in Shreveport at the Second Circuit Court of
Appeal, in Lake Charles at the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, and in Baton
Rouge at the L.S.U. Law Center Library. 1LA. REG. 167 (1975).
5. See note 1, supra.
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question of legislative procedure would have been considered.
a matter to be decided by the legislature itself, based on its
construction of the constitution. The fact that the suit was
filed, though, reflects a tendency in Louisiana to expect the
courts to exercise broad powers of judicial review and to decide questions many courts would not consider as raising a
case or controversy. This tendency is reflected in the 1974
constitution. The document not only contains the traditional
due process and equal protection formulas to allow the courts
to develop fundamental rights, it goes further. For example,
Art. III, § 6(B) provides that if the legislature fails to reapportion itself as required, "the supreme court, upon petition
of any elector, shall reapportion" the legislature. Art. IV,
§ 18(D) involves the court in determining the issue of inability
of a state official to perform his duties. These and other provisions reflect that the convention did not intend to restrict the
powers of the courts. On the contrary, they confirm existing
tendencies and constitutionalize a large role for the courts. It
is thus more important for the court to refer, as it did in
Hainkel, to the basic documents of the convention so as to
have an insight into its real purposes rather than to depend
on a fictionalized intent.
EQUAL PROTECTION
The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld, against equal protection attacks, two criminal statutes which classify on the
basis of sex. State v. Deval 6 upheld the prostitution statute,
which applies only to females, and State v. Barton7 upheld the
criminal non-support statute, which penalizes only males.
Both decisions discuss the federal equal protection guarantee, and Barton additionally discusses the applicability of Art.
I, § 3 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, which provides
that no law shall "arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably
discriminate against a person because of ... sex ......
Under both the federal and the state equal protection
provisions, the court is plunged into a deep and detailed discussion of statutory purposes and reasonable classifications
directed toward those purposes. The analyses available under
6. 302 So. 2d 909 (La. 1974). Chief Justice Sanders and Justice Barham
dissented; Justice Calegero dissented from the denial of a rehearing. See LA.
R.S. 14:82 (1950).
7. 315 So. 2d 289 (La. 1975). Justices Barham and Calegero dissented. See
LA. R.S. 14:74 (1950), as amended.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

both provisions are similar and take the courts into the outer
edge of the development of the law.
Though the United States Supreme Court has yet to hold
that sexual classifications are "suspect" and require strict
scrutiny, four members of the Court indicated that view." But
even if strict scrutiny is not required, the lesser "rational
basis" standard is now more demanding.9 Even granted that
the standards are inexact, the United States Supreme Court
still requires a greater "quantum of rationality" to support a
classification based on sex than was applied under the very
permissive standard of the 1940's and 1950's.10
The increase in judicial scrutiny is shown by the Court's
ceasing to presume that legislatures acted rationally and to
sustain classifications if any state of facts can be
hypothesized to support them. Instead, the Court is pursuing
a deeper analysis and a more thorough dissection of state
purposes to determine whether classifications actually accomplish those purposes. For example, in Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld it rejected hypothesized purposes for a statute
granting social security benefits to widows of covered workers
but denying them to widowers, instead concentrating on Congressis articulated purpose as shown by the statutory scheme
and legislative history." As the Court stated in footnote:
This Court need not in equal protection cases accept at
face value assertions of legislative purposes, when an
examination of the legislative scheme and its history
demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have
2
been a goal of the legislation.1

In terms of attitude and method of analysis at least, Devall and Barton are thus not in accord with the developing
equal protection standards of the United States Supreme
Court. Both cases are too content to rest on presumptions of
constitutionality and determinations of reasonableness that
do not rest on extensive factual discussions of articulated
state purposes. Even in applying the Louisiana equal protec8. Justices Brennan, Douglas, White and Marshall, in Frontiero v.
Richardeon, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). But cf. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
9. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
10. See Gunther, Foreward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-24

(1972).
11. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
12. Id. at 648 n.16.
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tion standard, it is probably inconsistent with the constitutional convention purpose to rely heavily on presumptions of
constitutionality.1 3 The convention debates also give little
support to the view that only a minimum rational basis is
14
sufficient.
Specifically, six major sexual classification decisions from
15
the United States Supreme Court in the past four years
produce an intriguing result, apart from the complicated
analyses used by the Court. The Court sustained two of the
six statutes in question, both of which discriminated against
men. The four statutes that were overturned discriminated
against, or were construed by the Court to discriminate
against, women. Kahn v. Shevin16 sustained a Florida taxation scheme granting exemptions from property tax to
widows but not to widowers. Justice Douglas's majority opinion stated that the Florida law was "reasonably designed to
further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of
spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden."' 17 This implication of permissible benign discrimination in favor of women was enlarged in
the footnote by which Justice Douglas distinguished Frontiero v. Richardson'8 because the classification in that case
was "not in any sense designed to rectify the effects of past
discrimination against women."' 19
Schlesinger v. Ballard20 allowed Navy regulations to impose more stringent promotion requirements for male officers
than for female officers. Here again, the opinion of the majority includes notions of permissible discrimination against
males because "women line officers had less opportunity for
promotion than did their male counterparts, and that a
longer period of tenure for women officers would, therefore,
13. Hargrave, The Declarationof Rights of the Louisiana Constitutionof
1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hargrave]; STATE OF
LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS,
Aug. 29, 1973 at 58, 59, 62 [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
14. Hargrave at 9; PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 30 at 3.
15. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin,
416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
16. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
17. Id. at 355.
18. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
19. Id. at 689 n.22.
20. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
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be consistent with the goal to provide women officers with
'fair and equitable career advancement programs.'-"21
In view of the apparent trend of these decisions, Devall is
somewhat suspect; it upholds the prostitution statute though
it is discriminatory against women. Barton may be on less
shaky ground; the non-support statute discriminates against
men, and arguably the statute is a benign classification
meant to rectify past discrimination against women which
resulted in their being less able to obtain good-paying jobs to
support themselves.
The crux of the equal protection analysis under both the
federal and the state provisions, of course, goes beyond these
considerations and hinges on the analysis of the purposes of a
statute and whether the classification in reality accomplishes
that purpose reasonably w'ell. In Devall, the majority opinion
finds a state purpose in solving a social problem, prostitution,
to which women contribute more than men. Cited in support
of this notion is Goesaert v. Cleary,22 a 1948 United States
Supreme Court decision which permitted a state to prohibit
women from tending bar unless they were the wife or daughter of a proprietor. But Goesaerthas been eroded significantly
by more than 20 years of changing equal protection doctrines
23
and is suspect in light of the scrutiny level of Reed v. Reed
and subsequent cases. A number of courts have departed
24
from its reasoning.
Perhaps the strongest arguments in favor of the statute
are that the scant empirical data available 25 indicates that
only ten per cent of the country's prostitutes are male while
ninety per cent are women, and that it is not unreasonable
for a state to attack ninety per cent of the problem and not
the remaining ten per cent. Even so, statistics about the fact
that more women are dependent on men than vice versa were
not sufficient to sustain statutes that discriminated against
26
women in Frontiero, Wiesenfeld and Stanton v. Stanton.
Also, if one accepts the majority's view in Devall that the
incidence of female prostitution reaches a threshold that
21. Id. at 508.
22. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
23. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
24. See, e.g., Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp.
593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Calif. 1971).
25. See authorities in 302 So. 2d 909, 914 n.6 (La. 1974) (Sanders, C.J.,
dissenting).
26. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
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prompts legislative action while the incidence of male prostitution does not, the additional question of empirical proof
remains. It is arguable that the prostitution statute in
Louisiana reflects a cultural and historical concept about
females in prostitution being the rule and the incidence of
male prostitution the exception. But a culturally based presumption not supported by factual data is not accepted automatically nor is it free from scrutiny. In light of the handling by the United States Supreme Court of justifications
resting on traditional notions about the place of women in
society, 27 Devall's use of similar conceptions, absent factual
bases to support them, is a questionable analytical device.
Granted that Kahn v. Shevin to some extent did rely on
the notion that widows have more difficulty finding goodpaying jobs than widowers, 28 a traditional assumption about
the role of women, the case is distinguishable from Devall
since it involved discrimination against a man rather than a
woman. Also, Justice Douglas's opinion emphasizes the wide
latitude that must be given states in the taxing area; the
state has not been given such a wide latitude in the criminal
law area.
Furthermore, as Chief Justice Sanders said in his dissent
in Devall, if the purpose of the prostitution statute is to prevent the spread of venereal disease, a questionable purpose in
a state which does not punish fornication, the classification
hardly seems to fit the purpose. If the purpose is to shield
citizens from annoyance, the classification hardly seems reasonable. He also argues that if the purpose is to control the
organized crime activity and its evils which often accompany
the practice of prostitution, the classification does not
reasonably accomplish its purpose. Here, the Chief Justice's
conclusion may be proper because of the absence of any factual data in the record to support an argument by the state
that organized crime activity is related almost exclusively to
prostitution by women and not to that by men. However, it is
at least arguable that such a state purpose would be proper if
the appropriate data to connect female prostitution (and not
male prostitution) with organized crime activity were shown.
But even if that argument survives, one must consider that
organized crime is fostered by the males who pay for sexual
27. See the interpretation of Reed v. Reed in Justice Brennan's opinion in
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973).
28. 416 U.S. at 354.
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services. Hence, the classification of the prostitution statute
may still be unreasonable because it does not reach those
males who contribute to the coffers of organized crime as
much, or more, than the women prostitutes they pay.
In Barton, the Louisiana Supreme Court finds reasonable
grounds for the discrimination in the non-support statute
because of the "fact of life, that between two spouses, the
' '2 9
husband is invariably the means of support for the couple.
One could argue from Kahn that the state has concluded that
women are unable to find well-paying employment to support
themselves and it is a permissible classification to discriminate against men so as to protect women in this regard. As in
Schlesinger, the discrimination in favor of women might be
benign. Still, Devall may be distinguishable. Kahn rests heavily on the notion of wide latitude in taxation matters, and this
wide latitude does not exist in the criminal law area. In
Schlesinger the discrimination against men resulted from the
Navy's earlier discrimination against women disallowing
them access to sea duty on the same terms as men and thus
depriving them of the type of military service most likely to
result in promotion.
Wiesenfeld may be most in point, in that its analysis bore
deeply into legislative purpose, and even Justice Rehnquist
was willing to admit the statute's purpose of protecting the
family upon the death of a parent was not met by providing
awards to widows with minor children but not to widowers in
similar circumstances. For the state to furnish a mechanism
to enforce that support it demands of both spouses in such a
way as to give only the female spouse the means to enforce
the duty puts the statute farther away from the reasonableness level than if it were otherwise the case. In addition, the
Supreme Court did overturn statutes that rested on the traditional notion that women are more in need of support than
men in Frontiero, Stanton and Wiesenfeld.
If the purpose, as Justice Barham stated in his dissent in
Barton,30 is to keep "a person off the public dole when there is
some financially able individual who is legally responsible for
his or her support," the classification also fails. On the other
hand, if the purpose is to protect those spouses most likely to
be dependent and to penalize spouses most likely to be able
financially to support the other, it is arguable that the gross
29. State v. Barton, 315 So. 2d 289, 291 (La. 1975).
30. Id. at 293.
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classification of the statute approaches the goal in a
sufficiently reasonable manner, as in Kahn. The difficulty
with that statement of purpose is that it is inconsistent with
the Louisiana Civil Code obligation of both spouses to support
each other.3 1 But it may be a permissible statement of purpose nonetheless, for the Louisiana Civil Code also grants
32
alimony only to women.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Notice and opportunity for hearing are among the most
fundamental requirements of due process in court proceedings. Saizan v. Saizan33 recognizes these requirements and
holds that an ex parte order by a district judge changing the
physical custody of a minor child without allowing an opportunity for a contradictory hearing is a denial of procedural
due process.
The Louisiana Supreme Court invoked procedural due
process in a criminal context in State v. Dawson.34 There,
after a number of continuances and other pre-trial delays,
trial was set for October 31, 1974 on charges of resisting an
officer and simple battery. That day neither the defendants
nor their retained counsel appeared for trial. Apparently
counsel had been notified of the trial date, but he neither
notified the defendants nor appeared himself because he considered the assignment of a trial date invalid. 35 On October
31, the defendants were located by a police officer who instructed them to proceed immediately to the courthouse,
which they did. The judge then appointed counsel to represent the defendants and proceeded with the trial, resulting in
a verdict of guilty. The appointed lawyer, in court on other
matters, was the brother of the retained counsel, and he
indicated that "since the court was going to appoint someone
else to represent them, he requested the appointment. However, he further stated that he was unprepared to defend
them on that date and that he proceeded 'under duress.' ",36
31. LA. CIV. CODE art. 119.

32. Id. arts. 148, 160.
33. 311 So. 2d 281 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
34. 316 So. 2d 109 (La. 1975).
35. "He considered the assignment invalid in view of the fact that the
motion for a bill of particulars filed on September 24, 1974 had not been
answered." Id. at 110.
36. Id. at 110-11.
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A unanimous Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the convictions because, under the circumstances, "[t]he lack of
notice of trial and absence of retained counsel on the date of
the trial denied defendants due process of law guaranteed
' 37
under both state and federal constitutions.
The opinion of the court is intriguing in that it rests its
decision on straight due process grounds, both state and federal, without indicating specifically the underlying reasons
why the conviction was a denial of due process. The result is a
broadly stated basis for decision when narrower grounds
were available.
One narrower ground for decision would hinge on the
denial of defendants' right to be represented by the counsel of
their choice, that right encompassing a requirement that the
judge allow defendants a reasonable time to contact their
retained attorney before appointing counsel and proceeding
with trial. 38 The principle that appointed counsel must be
given adequate time to prepare a defense also supports the
decision; otherwise, an accused is denied effective assistance
of counsel. 39 Some courts require that a continuance be requested and denied before the principle can be invoked, 40 but
a failure to request a continuance is not always fatal to the
claim that assistance of counsel was inadequate due to the
lack of time for preparation. 4 1 Even so, under the facts in
Dawson, though counsel may not have made a formal request
for a continuance as such, he was not prepared to try the
case. It further appears that some attorney would have been
appointed and that trial would have been held regardless; in
such a situation, a request for a continuance would have been
a useless act. With this factual record, the case could have
been decided largely on this factual basis even though a continuance was not requested.
37. Id. at 111.
38. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); Argo v. Wiman, 209 F. Supp. 299
(M.D. Ala. 1962). See al8o Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525 (1961); Hawk
v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945).
39. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Martin v. Virginia, 365 F.2d
549 (4th Cir. 1966); State v. Roberson, 157 La. 974, 103 So. 283 (1925); State v.
Boyd, 37 La. Ann. 781 (1885).
40. Lewis v. Territory of Hawaii, 210 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1954). In State v.
Boyd, 37 La. Ann. 781 (1885), counsel had requested a continuance.
41. United States v. Helwig, 159 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1947); United States v.
Yodock, 224 F. Supp. 877 (M.D. Pa. 1963).
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The court in Dawson mentions in passing, but does not
hinge its decision on, article 702 of the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure, which provides in part, "The defendant
shall be given notice of trial sufficiently in advance thereof so
that he may summon his witnesses." That provision is susceptible of the construction that notice to defense counsel is
not adequate and that notice to the defendants themselves is
required. Such a requirement would be in accord with the
implications of Henry v. Mississippi42 that conduct by counsel
does not always bind an accused. However, an absolute rule
might be inconsistent with the implication of the article that
the concern is not with defendant's appearance, but with time
to summon witnesses. There was no factual basis in Dawson
to determine that lack of notice affected the accuseds' ability
to obtain witnesses. Of course, basing the decision on the
failure to notify the defendants, although counsel had been
notified, would strike at the customary notions of the legal
profession that dealing with counsel is for almost all purposes
dealing with the client himself.
Nonetheless, the decision in Dawson to reverse the conviction rests squarely on due process grounds, the denial of
due process being lack of notice of trial and absence of retained counsel on the date of trial. Thus, the decision rests
largely on the failure of counsel to notify his clients of their
trial date, and the fact that no other notice was given to
them. The implication remains that absence of counsel would
be insufficient to support the decision and that, at least in
these circumstances, failure of the defendants to receive actual notice of their trial date is an element of procedural due
43
process, even though their attorney received that notice.
The result is clearly correct under either of the theories
mentioned earlier. The due process means of reaching the
result is also no great extension of due process principles, for
it is certainly plausible that fundamental fairness in procedure requires that the accused have actual notice of his trial
date, and that notice to counsel, when he fails to notify the
defendants, is not adequate. Though no great extension as
such, it remains an extension of due process requirements.
42. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
43. When neither defendants nor their counsel received notice of a trial
date, judgments were reversed. State v. Casanave, 149 La. 715, 90 So. 107
(1921); State v. Townsend, 44 La. Ann. 569, 10 So. 926 (1892).
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PRELIMINARY HEARING

The Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to issue a full opinion discussing the type of preliminary examination required
by Art. I, § 14 of the Constitution of 1974. However, it has
denied writs in a number of cases contesting the adequacy of
such hearings. 44 Granted that such writ denials are of little
formal precedential value, it is nonetheless disturbing that
preliminary examinations are being held which violate the
understanding of the requirements for such hearings which
the drafters of the constitution had and expressed in the
debates on the proposition.
As a matter of federal constitutional law, Gerstein v.
Pugh45 requires only a limited preliminary hearing, but Gerstein in no way prevents the state from requiring a more
detailed and formalized preliminary hearing. If the
background, intent and purpose of the drafters of the
Louisiana constitutional provision has any relevance, the
state requirement is much more demanding than Gerstein.
Art. I, § 14 was proposed by floor amendment. Supporters
of the amendment made it clear that the aim of the amendment was to overturn the decisions of the Louisiana Supreme
Court allowing a defendant's right to a preliminary examination to be defeated by the district attorney filing a bill of
information. 46 One of the sponsors of the amendment, Delegate A. J. Planchard, said:
Presently, a defendant or an accused has a right to a
preliminary examination, but it's discretionary with the
court whether or not it will be granted. You have to make
application for it and it's within the discretion of the
court.
What this amendment does is it makes a preliminary
examination a matter of right for the accused. 47
44. E.g., State v. Perkins, 316 So. 2d 385 (La. 1975).
45. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
46. See State v. McCoy, 258 La. 645, 247 So. 2d 562 (1971); State v. Pesson,
256 La. 201, 235 So. 2d 568 (1970). See also Hargrave at 48.
47. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 14, 1973 at 20. Delegate Chris Roy further stated:
"So the way it works now is if a defendant, an accused, rather, is being held
in jail with no charge against him yet, and he asks for a preliminary examination. He goes to court. The morning of the preliminary examination, the
district attorney on his own motion then files a Bill of Information charging
him with theft, let's say. At that time, he is no longer entitled to the preliminary examination to determine whether he should be held on any charge
.... "Id. at 25.
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That background, at the least, indicates that a broad construction of the provision is warranted; the purpose was to
overcome and broaden the narrow construction of the right to
a preliminary hearing.
The record also discloses the expectation of a truly adversary proceeding with the necessity of producing witnesses to
an offense. Delegate Planchard stated:
A preliminary examination is exactly what it is. You have
a right to ask the court to grant an examination. You
have a right to call the witnesses against you, and you
48
have a right to do this in the court.
The convention discussed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Pugh v. Rainwater4 9 and its requirement of
a full-scale preliminary hearing. It was that case expanding
the right, not the subsequent 1975 Supreme Court decision in
Gerstein narrowing the right, that provided the background
for Art. I, § 14. The delegates had in mind the kind of hearing
of Rainwater and not that of Gerstein.
In addition, the convention worked with a background of
Louisiana statutes dealing with the preliminary examination.
Art. I, § 14 was meant to enlarge the right under the existing
Louisiana statutes. And those statutes, too, contemplate a
fuller preliminary examination than that contemplated by
50
Gerstein.
In light of these considerations, one ought to conclude
that Art. I, § 14 is not satisfied by the Gerstein preliminary
hearing. To comply with both requirements, the state must be
prepared to provide for two preliminary examinations of the
accused, a rather inefficient and costly duplication of effort,
48. Id. at 20. Delegate Mack Abraham said: "As I understand the preliminary examination, A.J., the prosecuting attorney and the defense attorney would be there in front of a judge and would be able to question witnesses or the accused?" Id. at 22. Later in the debate, Delegate Jackson Burson,
Jr., answered a question from Delegate Walter J. Lanier, Jr.:
Mr. Lanier: "Well, let me suggest one other reason, Mr. Burson. Couldn't
a defendant then subpoena all of the state's witnesses and put them on the
witness stand and get all of their evidence from them?"
Mr. Burson: "Well, of course, that's presuming he knew who the state's
witnesses were beforehand." Id. at 28.
49. 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973).
50. LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 294 specifies that "at a preliminary examination the state and the defendant may produce witnesses, who shall be
examined in the presence of the defendant and shall be subject to crossexamination. The defendant may also testify, subject to cross-examination
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or it must guarantee that one preliminary examination provides adequate opportunity to present evidence and to crossexamine as the new constitution requires. As Delegate Planchard said,
I know that there will be objection because they'll say it
will increase the number of cases in the preliminary
examinations, that would be a burden upon the courts.
That's a lot of poppycock. Sure there'll be more preliminary examinations. But a person accused should have
that right to an examination. 51
A quick, full preliminary examination is not only an advantage to the defendant; it also offers advantages to the
state. If a prosecution is halted at the preliminary examination stage because of facts uncovered there, the state is saved
the cost of further proceedings and avoids the waste of time
involved in pursuing a case that ought not be tried because
the evidence is so weak.
BILL TITLES
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Terrebonne Parish
Police Jury v. Board of Comm'rs52 held a statute unconstitutional for failing to have "a title indicative of its object" as
required by Art. III, § 16 of the 1921 constitution. The statute
provided in part that a parish-wide drainage district formed
in Terrebonne Parish would receive fifty per cent of the contribution of funds made by the parish to the Atchafalaya
Basin Levee District. The title of the bill included the language, "to provide for the receipt of certain funds, and other'53
wise to provide with respect thereto.
The court determined that the title reference was inadequate because it did not mention the Atchafalaya Levee
Basin District, which was to lose funds by virtue of the transfer, and said nothing about a transfer of funds from one
agency to another. The "truncated language gives no one fair
notice that substantial funds were to be transferred annually
from a long-established political corporation providing flood
protection to the new forced drainage district." The court
considered a transfer of funds "from the political corporation
51. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 14, 1973 at 20.

52. 306 So. 2d 707 (La. 1975).
53. La. Acts 1970, No. 610.
54. 306 So. 2d at 709.
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that collects them for its special purposes to another political
corporation . . . an extraordinary legislative subject. Such
extraordinary subject matter must be indicated by the title in
55
such a manner as to apprise the public of the change.1
Though one might question the wisdom of a constitutional rule requiring statute titles indicative of their objects,
the 1974 constitution continues a similar requirement but
makes a significant change. Art. III, § 15(A) requires that a
bill "contain a brief title indicative of its object." Addition of
the word "brief" to modify the word "title" indicates that a
lesser standard is to be applied to bill titles under the new
provision. Such matters, of course, are changes in degree and
cannot be quantified into simple rules; nonetheless, under the
new document, a lower level of "indicativeness" is needed for
titles.
THE $3 LICENSE PLATE
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Gulf States Utilities Co.
v. Traigle56 determined that "an automobile owned by a business enterprise and used for business purposes is statutorily
taxable as a commercial vehicle" 57 at the rate of $10.00 per
license and that such a tax is not prohibited by the former
constitutional provision imposing only a $3.00 license fee "[o]n
automobiles for private use. '5 8 The 1974 constitution continues the prior provision in similar language:
The legislature shall impose an annual license tax of
three dollars on automobiles for private use, and on other
motor vehicles, an annual license tax based upon horsepower, carrying capacity, weight, or any of these. No
parish or municipality may impose a license fee on motor
59
vehicles.
Since the new document continues the reference to "automobiles for private use," the new constitution would require the same result in the instant case.
It may be intriguing to speculate whether the language
allows taxes greater than $3.00 even on automobiles for pri55. Id.
56. 310 So. 2d 78 (La. 1975).
57. Id. at 86. See LA. R.S. 47:451 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No.
96, § 5; LA. R.S. 47:463(A)(1) (Supp. 1954); LA. R.S. 47:475 (1950).
58. La. Const. art. VI, § 22(a) (1921).
59. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
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vate use. The language used ("The legislature shall impose")
by its terms does not prohibit the legislature from imposing a
higher tax, and the constitution, in contrast, states other
prohibitions in exact terms in many instances ("No law shall
•..,,).60 Nonetheless, the debate on the provision indicates the
belief that the section operated as a prohibition; 61 defeat of an
amendment to delete the provision further indicated this belief.62 But, as a supporter of the provision explained, even if
the legislature cannot raise the license tax, it could impose
other automobile-related taxes to raise revenue. Delegate
Walter J. Champagne, Jr., a member of the Committee on
Revenue, Finance and Taxation which drafted the provision,
while explaining that keeping the $3.00 license plate was
necessary to win support for the constitution at the polls,
stated:
I suggest to you that that is no limit whatsoever, because
all they have to do is raise the license to drive an automobile, which has been done on occasion ....63
60.
61.
62.
63.

E.g., LA. CONST.art. I, §§ 3, 7, 8, 9.
PROCEEDINGS, Dec. 14, 1973 at 84-87.
Id. at 87-100.
Id. at 84.

